

JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION

**PARLIAMENTARY INSPECTOR OF THE
CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION “ANNUAL REPORT 2017–2018”**



**TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN AT PERTH
WEDNESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 2019**

SESSION ONE

Members

**Ms M.M. Quirk, MLA (Chair)
Hon Jim Chown, MLC (Deputy Chair)
Mr M. Hughes, MLA
Hon Alison Xamon, MLC**

Hearing commenced at 9.51 am**Hon MICHAEL MURRAY, AM, QC****Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission, examined:**

The DEPUTY CHAIR: We gather here this morning, Mr Murray, to discuss your annual report. Before that, we have some statutory requirements. On behalf of the committee, I thank you for agreeing to appear today. My name is Jim Chown and I am the Deputy Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission. I would like to introduce the other members: Hon Alison Xamon and Mr Matthew Hughes, MLA. It is important that you understand that any deliberate misleading of this committee may be regarded as a contempt of Parliament. Your evidence is protected by parliamentary privilege; however, the privilege does not apply to anything that you might say outside of today's proceedings.

Before we begin with any of our questions, do you have any questions about your attendance here today, or an opening statement you wish to make?

Mr Murray: No, I have no questions. I am content with the idea of an opening statement, but it is potentially such a wide ranging hearing that we are about to embark upon that it is difficult to know what to say by way of an opening statement and what to leave out. There are a couple of things that I wanted to say to start off with. The first was to apologise for the absence of my assistant, Murray Alder, who was also invited to attend this morning and has been unable to do so because he is away on leave. One thing that his absence has demonstrated is how much I depend upon him.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Mr Murray, can I just confirm: has he been replaced while he is away?

Mr Murray: No.

Hon ALISON XAMON: So your office is still having to meet all —

Mr Murray: I am it at the moment.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: I find that very concerning, Mr Murray —

Hon ALISON XAMON: So do I.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: — especially in regard to the 138 per cent increase over the past four or five years that your office has undertaken.

What can you do, to replace Mr Alder to help with the workload?

Mr Murray: I can seek, informally, to get help through the department that services my office, which is the Department of Justice, and I shall do that. There is a process of secondment that can be utilised under the act, but otherwise the process of providing staff and assistance under the act is down to

me as an independent office and takes rather longer than five minutes to get organised, if you get somebody who is prepared to take it on. I will have to try for that, I think,

I wanted to simply record my apology for his absence.

At the moment, to answer your question, Deputy Chair, about how I am able to manage, my position, as you know, is strictly part-time—two days a week. I am now putting in every hour that is available to keep up as much as I can, and so far I am managing. It is an interesting time for the office. The other observation I may make is that I have two acting inspectors now on deck, which I can use. The first is Matthew Howard, SC, who has completed a term as an acting inspector with Craig Colvin, who of course dropped out of that scene when he was appointed to the Federal Court. In place of him, a newbie for us is Hon John Chaney, who has just now retired from the Supreme Court and agreed to take it on. That may be another avenue by which I can get some assistance. The difficulty is not so much in completing the work; it is the organisational side, wrestling with computers and things of that sort, which I suppose I am best described as rather inept at doing.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Thank you for that, Mr Murray. We need to move on as time is limited. We have 45 minutes for you and we do have some questions.

[10.00 am]

Mr Murray: Yes, by all means. Perhaps I might come to the workload aspect. You will have noted from the annual report the reduction, which is continuing to be the case, in relation to matters that are referred by way of reporting by the commission in accordance with the protocol that we have under section 196(4) of the act. I am persuaded that this is settling now to a point where the major part of the work of my office will be in relation to matters that arise from complaints that are made directly to the office about the performance of officers of the commission, or the commission itself in some cases. That is, I think, going to be a useful thing, and it has meant that I have been able to give more attention to general matters concerning the operations of the commission. I obtained from them, relatively recently, and reviewed all of their policy documents in relation to various aspects of their work; for example, the use of processes of investigation which are rather extraordinary under the act and the considerations that are involved in relation to such matters. Perhaps one of the most concerning matters, which was the subject of those and in relation to which I have been able to have an input into the policies that are provided, is in relation to matters like assumed identities—the extent to which they are used, the extent to which investigators have a number of different identities at the one time and use them, and the impact of that sort of activity in relation to things like driving offences and matters of that sort.

More recently, there is an inquiry underway in relation to an agreement or memorandum of understanding between the Commissioner of Police and the CCC in relation to access by CCC officers to the database operated by WAPOL. That was initiated by a complaint, but coincidentally had been looked at in any event. The matter of complaint was that police say that the CCC officers were browsing into areas that were not directly the subject of their notified access, so digging and discovering I suppose is a way to put it in areas that were not subject to any particular investigation or inquiry at the moment.

On the other hand is the relationship between the police and the commission in relation to such matters as the use of section 42 of the act and the capacity to stop off a joint investigation by the police and the commission if the commission feels that it is best handled by the commission acting alone. As you will understand from the nature of that, that obviously can be a matter of friction and difficulty between them. That is a matter that has now had to be resolved, effectively by agreement

and sensitivity and the use of the section 42 process by the commission rather more sensitively than was originally the case.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Mr Murray, we have a series of questions we would really like to put to you. Can I please start with the questions I would like to ask, if that is okay with you, Deputy Chair?

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Yes, go ahead.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Thanks very much. We have very limited time. I want to pick up on the issue of your role in the oversight of the CCC, specifically its officers. You have raised concerns that you think there is a legislative gap in being able to oversight allegations of wrongdoing by CCC officers in relation to activities that have occurred before they have been employed by the CCC. I wanted to explore that a little more. Is your concern that you think the CCC effectively has a conflict of interest in terms of investigating its own officers? Is that your principal concern?

Mr Murray: No, it is not. The two cases that were the subject of the report are perhaps illustrative of the areas of potential difficulty. I think the CCC ought to be in a position where they have an investigative capacity in relation to the conduct of their own officers.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Current and past?

Mr Murray: Yes.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Sorry, in terms of current, but also in terms of behaviour that occurred prior to their appointment?

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Prior to their employment.

Mr Murray: Yes. But with my oversight, which resolves any question of conflict of interest really, because where it is a misconduct allegation, the protocol, which is immensely useful between us, means that they strictly apply their obligation under section 196 of the act to inform me of any allegations that may concern or are concerning a CCC officer.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Can I confirm that you are advised of it, but you do not have the authority to be able to subsequently investigate independently, or to request that the CCC cease that investigation so that you can take that up; is that correct?

Mr Murray: I have the capacity and I exercise it to make my views known about what I think the CCC should be doing about that —

Hon ALISON XAMON: But you cannot investigate yourself.

Mr Murray: — but I cannot take it over. You saw in the report that was recently delivered by me the case of the self-reporting by the CCC officer in relation to alleged sexual assault that had occurred when he was a police officer years earlier. In the end, because I was unhappy with the course of the investigation that had been undertaken in relation to that—in fact, not to put too fine a point on it, the commission said that there was nothing available in relation to their inquiry that would support the contention of the commission of sexual assault, and so they pulled the plug on that and said that there was nothing more to be done. I took the view that it was a serious allegation that required much more intensive investigation. You will have noticed that I did that by saying that I actually undertook that investigation myself. Strictly speaking, it was an investigation into what occurred 20 years earlier when the officer was a police officer. I hesitate to use a term, but I think I must: I dressed it up by saying—I think it was a respectable argument—that because he self-reported and at the same time denied the truth of any such allegation that had been made by the lady concerned to his wife, if that self-reporting and denial was false, it was deliberately false and directly impinged upon his suitability to be employed as a commissioned officer. I suppose the way to put it is that I got it through the back door.

Mr M. HUGHES: It was a work-around. What would you see as a remedy to the dilemma that you are placed in?

Mr Murray: I think it needs to be addressed directly by brief statutory amendment.

Mr M. HUGHES: And you have outlined those?

Mr Murray: Yes.

[10.10 am]

Mr M. HUGHES: Yes, and we are aware of what they are. How important is this in your view?

Mr Murray: Not terribly.

Mr M. HUGHES: Not terribly?

Mr Murray: No.

Mr M. HUGHES: So you would not go to the wall on it?

Mr Murray: No, I do not think so. It often arises more without argument than it does attract argument.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: I am a little surprised that you do not think it is that important, Mr Murray.

Mr Murray: I am not saying that it is not important.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: The integrity of the CCC, which is made up of human beings, and their integrity in regard to investigating other matters, needs to be above reproach. If you have an investigator that cannot be investigated prior to their employment and then they are found wanting under the employment —

Hon ALISON XAMON: And there is no-one who can compel that.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: — that dilutes the integrity of the organisation, or calls it into question in regard to its investigators' ability to conduct themselves appropriately.

Mr Murray: I was rather looking at it from the point of view of how widely should my oversight obligations be framed, which is a rather different question, if I may say so. I can make use of that part of the act that talks about my capacity to review their processes and procedures, but there is a consistent restriction there, because I do that not for the purpose of sitting effectively as an appellant body over the decisions and actions of the CCC, but for the purpose of determining whether the processes they are using are effective and appropriate. That is the wording of the statute, and so it should be, I think, unless you create out of my office an entity that is significantly different to the current situation.

Hon ALISON XAMON: This issue of oversight of the CCC and checks and balances and how we make sure that the extraordinary powers are not abused is a very live issue for us at the moment. As you would be aware, legislative reform is currently being contemplated to extend the capacity of the CCC to be able to investigate members of Parliament. Considering that members of Parliament are also supposed to play the role of part of that oversight function of the CCC, I am asking whether you think that there is merit in ensuring that when the CCC is undertaking investigations of any member of Parliament whether in fact that should be drawn to your attention so that you can ensure that the procedures being followed are respectful of parliamentary privilege and also are not politically motivated because, of course, there is tension in this area and unfortunately the CCC has had a pretty chequered history in this regard as well. I would be very curious to know whether you think that is an additional power to your office that you think warrants some merit.

Mr Murray: Again, I think it is arguably the case that there ought to be some oversight in relation to that area as much as in relation to any other area of the CCC's investigations. How you limit it and how effectively that may operate then in relation to that sort of process would be a matter, not so much for the way in which the statutory scheme is formulated, as in relation to the arm's length way, if that is the appropriate description, of the commission's activities. It very much depends upon the extent to which the commission takes the view, as it now does and purports to do, that its task is not to uncover particular matters of transgression of the law so much as to identify and make recommendations concerning corruption in what might be described as general hotspots in particular areas.

Hon ALISON XAMON: But of course this is not something that is prescribed by statute. This is simply a direction that has been articulated by the current commissioner, so it could change with another commissioner and, if you like, revert back to some of the previous practices, which were more problematic. My interest is in the statutory oversight and what limitations are put on that and the accountability around that. That was the purpose of my asking that question, to understand the degree to which that might be enshrined. But I also want to ask another question. You would probably be aware of the recent Procedure and Privileges Committee report on the issues of parliamentary privilege. A number of comments were made about the tardiness of the CCC in alerting Parliament, for example—or a complete failure to alert Parliament—to matters on which they are meant to report. In your opinion, do you think there is a systemic concern with the CCC not adhering to either statutory requirements to report or to adhere to MOUs. I am very interested, particularly in your observations around broader issues of the CCC's adherence to when it has given undertakings to other entities to behave a certain way.

Mr Murray: In my dealings with the commission I do not think I could fairly say that I have developed a concern about the matters of the kind that you raise.

Hon ALISON XAMON: I just want to confirm then: you are saying that there is or is not a concern in relation to the way the CCC is undertaking its —

[10.20 am]

Mr Murray: Potentially so, but I have not encountered conduct by the commission that would lead one to the view that there is a live issue that needs urgent attention. There are some areas of general investigation and inquiry in relation to the structures and processes of the commission which are very live at the moment but which I think demonstrate the limitation of what you can do by way of governance of these areas by statute. Another particular matter to which I refer is this question of the structure of an integrity commission, its capacity to name people, its capacity to name findings and its capacity, by the report process, to create what might be described as collateral damage to individuals before they are found to have been guilty of anything. There are real difficulties in that area.

I have recently given a paper on the topic generally arising out of the discussion about the establishment of a commonwealth integrity agency. I gave a paper not so long ago—last year—to the National Administrative Law Conference held at the University of New South Wales. The format was interesting. Papers were given by myself and Hon Stephen Charles, AO, QC—a former member of the Court of Appeal of Victoria. He very much espoused what I might describe as the New South Wales ICAC view that public exposure and public naming was an important part of the effectiveness of their inquiries. I expressed concern that that was the case and I said it should not be the case, and I was not of the view—it had not been demonstrated to me—that it was a requirement of effective legislative framework in this area.

The difficulty, however, is perhaps demonstrated by this proposition: if you concede that there are areas where the proper performance of the duties of the commissions, and in my case as well, my duties, involves naming individuals who are found to have been guilty of misconduct or to have been involved in corruption, then you establish a statutory process that allows it. It becomes inevitably a matter of discretionary judgement as to whether in any given case it is appropriate for that to occur. I am at present working with the commissioner to refine their approach and, hopefully, keep that under control. It is a matter that is reflected in the extent to which you name people and conduct public hearings in circumstances that are designed to expose particular areas of difficulty and encourage people to come forward.

It is a very vexed area, but the point I make about it is simply this: it seems to me that there are circumstances where that sort of activity is going to be required to enable the authority, or the agencies, to perform their job properly, and how refined their particular approaches are has to be then a matter of discretionary judgement and careful formulation of the considerations that apply to that.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Can we just get back to the report please, if that is okay?

The DEPUTY CHAIR: I do have a question in regard to the report; namely, section 196 of the act. Let us call it a demarcation dispute in regard to whether the location you view the highly sensitive CCC documents is your office or their office. I am a little confused here, Mr Murray, because, as I have said, these documents are highly sensitive. I am just wondering, does it really matter whether they are audited? Why would it be pursued that they be delivered to your office as opposed to remaining in a very secure area such as the CCC offices?

Mr Murray: When they come to my office, they come to a very secure area.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: But they are still in transit.

Mr Murray: But the danger is, I suppose, that somebody might know the officers who bring them under lock and key in their briefcase and they might be attacked and material stolen.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: On previous occasions, your office has audited these documents in the CCC offices.

Mr Murray: No.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Never?

Mr Murray: No. They were always brought and audited and then copies taken and returned under a controlled process. The commission thought that that should not occur and that I should go there and review the materials there. I was not happy with that, not because it was making my life more difficult or anything of that kind, but that it sent the wrong message as to the primacy of my role over that of the commission. Do I make that clear?

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Yes.

Mr Murray: It really was simply on that basis that I dug in my heels and said that they should come to me, and that is the way the act is written.

Hon ALISON XAMON: I would like to pick up on the issue of the CCC's investigation of the police, which, as we know, has been highlighted in a number of previous reports, not only as being the highest number of complaints but also the highest number of complaints that are not subsequently investigated by the CCC. Do you perceive that there is a lack of willingness on behalf of the CCC to investigate allegations against police officers—we note that there are a lot that simply get referred back to the police department for internal investigation—or do you suspect that this might be a resourcing issue? I ask specifically about the police.

Mr Murray: To my mind it needs to be understood that when the CCC are conducting an investigation of that kind, they do it—if they do it this way, which as you say, is generally the case—by referring the matter to the internal affairs unit of the police. That does not end the process so far as the commission is concerned. It maintains the oversight and gives directions, in just the same way that where a complaint is made to me and I think it should be further investigated, I refer that back to the commission to continue to do its work.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Although of course we have seen that when you have done that in the past, it has been ignored. We saw that with Cunningham and Atoms.

Mr Murray: The act is written in a way that does not invest in me powers of direction which they are bound to apply.

Hon ALISON XAMON: This is why I am trying to ask the question about the culture within the CCC itself. Of course, there are those statutory limitations. No-one can compel the CCC to undertake those investigations, but there are still a very limited number of investigations that the CCC is undertaking independently against the police, despite the literally thousands of allegations that they receive each year.

Mr Murray: My point was that I have seen no evidence that the response that refers the initial inquiry to the internal affairs unit produces a less effective investigation by the commission overseeing that process and giving directions and instructions as to its performance than if the commission itself were to do that legwork, which the internal affairs unit is doing.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Of course, we have seen that a number of the matters that have been pursued by the CCC against the police have been well aided by the fact that CCTV vision happens to be available at that point, which means that you really have to question how much of an investigation it really requires because they are then able to make it publicly available and everyone can see that a wrongdoing has been undertaken. My concern in relation to the extraordinary powers they have is that there may be a degree of cherry-picking of those investigations, which actually can be undertaken pretty easily anyway, as opposed to using those powers to look into the far more complex and serious allegations, which simply get referred back to internal affairs.

Mr Murray: Yes, I understand. How you modify the process, though, is a challenging issue. Here you are putting me in a situation where I am effectively speaking for the commission, and I am only doing that on the basis of anecdotal knowledge. My understanding is that they would take the view that if you required all of those matters to be investigated, and investigated directly by the commission, it would blow their budget completely.

[10.30 am]

Hon ALISON XAMON: So you see it as a budgetary limitation to being able to undertake those investigations?

Mr Murray: I have no idea, but that is what the commission says.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Okay; thank you.

Mr Murray: I could imagine that that might well be right.

Mr M. HUGHES: There will be many frivolous complaints about the behaviour of police officers that are triaged out by the commission, but where we point to evidence that you have reviewed a decision by the commission and found it wanting, and have made those points to the commission, and the commission in fact chooses not to take up the points that you have made about the need for further investigation. Is there a need to give you the capacity in certain circumstances—it would have to be defined—where you can direct the commission to go about its business again?

Mr Murray: These cases where it has arisen and caused difficulty are relatively few.

Mr M. HUGHES: They are notorious ones, though, are they not?

Mr Murray: They are.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Serious miscarriage of justice.

Mr M. HUGHES: Serious ones, and we can talk about that.

Mr Murray: Some of them are cases where the commission responds by going back and redoing matters. One or two have caused me real concern, where the commission has responded to me and said, "Look, we simply don't have the resources to go back and do this again." Under those circumstances, I keep going back to too many years ago when, as a prosecutor, the one thing we would not allow to govern the decision whether to prosecute a matter was whether there were funds available to mount it; you did it.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: In your opinion, do you believe that the CCC is under-resourced?

Mr Murray: Again, I do not know. My view would be that given the sort of processes they employ and the approach they take, they manage well with the resources that are available. If you were going to change that framework of performance, again it is an anecdotal observation by me, but I would see no reason to doubt that they would require an organisation twice the size of that which currently exists. The question then to be asked is: to what good effect? After all, you are speaking to me and I am a person who sees no difficulty in public oversight of investigative agencies investigating their own. I do not understand the concept of conflict of interest in those circumstances, because it assumes, for example, officers in the internal affairs unit of the police department will fudge the books to protect other police officers. There is no evidence that that occurs, nor is there evidence, I think, that it occurs when the commission notifies me of an allegation concerning its officers and I say, "Well, all right, you keep it and investigate it, keep me informed, make sure you don't do this and you do do that", and away they go. By and large, it seems to me that that is an effective and efficient process which allows for the ultimate test of public scrutiny of the outcome. Beyond that, I am not sure that public moneys would be usefully expended in the substantially greater amounts that would be required.

Hon ALISON XAMON: In your report, you highlight that the PICCC has no power to oversee the Public Sector Commissioner in her role when she is dealing with allegations of minor misconduct.

Mr Murray: What was that part?

Hon ALISON XAMON: You do not have any power to oversee the Public Sector Commissioner in her role when she is overseeing matters of minor misconduct.

Mr Murray: That is not quite right. Recently I had a conference with—forgive me; her name has escaped me—the recently-appointed Public Sector Commissioner.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Sharyn O'Neill.

Mr Murray: Thank you. This happens to me all the time. We reinforced the fact that between her office and mine, there is a protocol in relation to minor misconduct. I do hate that term, as you know.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: So do I.

Mr Murray: It is ridiculous. Why that statute ever used it, I do not know. Anyway, that is a completely different rant on my part.

Ms O'Neill said that they well understood, and she would ensure that they meticulously carried out the protocol which they have with my office, which is in the same terms as the commission has in

relation to allegations of serious misconduct, so that they would come to me. The reason I had the conference with her was that nothing was coming. The answer was that there has been no failure to apply the protocol. So there you are. In relation to matters of minor misconduct, on that basis, you are presiding over a public service which is squeaky clean.

Hon ALISON XAMON: So you are happy with the way it is working?

Mr Murray: I have no way of otherwise testing the water in relation to that.

Hon ALISON XAMON: I think this harks back a little to the tone of some of the questions I was asking before about the CCC and the MOUs. You have raised the time of the notifications from the CCC as sometimes being delayed more than is appropriate. Again, this is an issue which, as I mentioned, has been picked up in other reports as well, such as the procedure and privileges report. Can you talk about what you think to be a reasonable time frame, and how often has the CCC been tardy in relation to these time frames?

Mr Murray: That is in relation to their notification of allegations concerning their officers?

Hon ALISON XAMON: They are the notifications under section 196(4).

Mr Murray: The protocol requires the allegation to be notified as soon as is reasonably practical.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Whatever that means.

Mr Murray: Yes, of course you are right, but what else would one say? To limit it, the obligation by a time simply does not work. You cannot do that.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Yet you have made the observation that you think it is tardy.

Mr Murray: There have been cases from time to time.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Clearly, you have an idea of what you consider to be a reasonable time frame, so what would that be?

Mr Murray: I think if their officers are alert to the obligation, then it is a matter that a couple of weeks should provide ample time to put together the material that has to be sent to me to do so.

Hon ALISON XAMON: Do you see this as an ongoing issue with the CCC—that they are perhaps a little lax or reticent with their notifications?

[10.40 am]

Mr Murray: I do not see any evidence of reticence. The instructions that operate within the commission's procedures make it very clear that anything of that kind will not be tolerated by the senior hierarchy of the commission. I accept that that is correct and that is appropriate. The reason I accept that is that the protocol itself establishes a framework, which is a vast improvement over that which operated prior to Hon John McKechnie's appointment as commissioner, where there were arguments about whether or not a particular matter was an "allegation" and what that meant—there were debates of that kind that went on—whereas now, the protocol is meticulously operated upon the basis that there will be no argument. Anything that may be viewed as an allegation concerning an officer of the commission comes to me and I decide whether it is a matter to be investigated in relation to misconduct, and usually that decision does no more than endorse the decision that has already been taken by the commission. I do not have a view that there is any reticence about it. What does happen from time to time is that I think it is demonstrated that individual officers will sometimes overlook the obligation, or the statement that is made—"You are all corrupt, you donkeys"—is not an allegation but an epithet, and that might be right. The difficulty that sometimes occurs is in relation to whether or not a complainant is simply expressing

disappointment about the outcome of an investigation by the CCC or whether he is attributing to the CCC investigator a corrupt motive in relation to the final outcome.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Thank you, Mr Murray. I will close today's hearing in regard to your annual report. Thank you sincerely for your attendance.

Thank you for your evidence before the committee today. A transcript of this hearing will be forwarded to you for the correction of minor errors. Any such corrections must be made and the transcript returned within 10 days from the date of the letter attached to the transcript. If the transcript is not returned within this period, it will be deemed to be correct. New material cannot be added via these corrections and the sense of your evidence cannot be altered. Should you wish to provide additional information or elaborate on particular points, please include a supplementary submission for the committee's consideration when you return your corrected transcript of evidence. Thank you once again for attending. We look forward to seeing you at some stage in the future.

Mr Murray: May I say that the committee has both challenged and welcomed and made my position easier, as is always the case at these hearings. Thank you very much.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: Thank you, and we certainly hope that your staffing issue is resolved as soon as possible.

Mr Murray: Yes. Thank you.

The DEPUTY CHAIR: It is of great concern to this committee that the very important work you undertake is backing up behind you as such.

Hearing concluded at 10.44 am
