

PARLIAMENT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA  
UNIFORM LEGISLATION AND STATUTES REVIEW COMMITTEE – PUBLIC  
HEARINGS ON SUBMISSIONS

QUESTIONS ON LAW SOCIETY SUBMISSION

*Res Judicata*

**Response to Question 1:**

1.1 Explanation of the operation of *Res Judicata* in planning practice:

Where an issue between two parties has been determined by a Court, the issue cannot be the subject of adjudication again by the same or a different Court. A party unhappy with the decision of the Court is prevented by the principle of *Res Judicata* from attempting the same Court or a different Court.

1.2 In planning practice, if an Application for planning approval is refused, the Applicant is unable to have that Application re-adjudicated, but if the Applicant brings forward the **same** planning proposal in a **fresh Application**, then there is nothing to prevent that fresh Application from being considered and determined by the responsible planning authority.

1.3 In that sense, the principle of *Res Judicata* does not apply to prevent the reconsideration and fresh determination in regard to the same proposal. The proposal being considered is indeed the same, but because there is a fresh Application, there is no *Res Judicata*.

1.4 Planning authorities are aware that, in the absence of special provisions in their planning schemes, they may have to receive, consider and determine repeat applications.

1.5 BUT this seldom happens, because the prudent Applicant understands that repeated Applications to the same planning authority are likely to result in the same determination, so that the Application fees and any related consultant fees would be wasted.

1.6 However under the DAPs regime, the Applicant with a proposal valued in the optional range of \$2m to \$10m (non City of Perth), has the option of lodging its Application with either the responsible authority (LG or WAPC), or with the JDAP.

1.7 The purpose of the JDAP has always been presented as allowing developers the option of determination by an independent panel with majority technical expert membership or by the normal responsible authority. It has never been suggested that the DAP regime was intended, or even contemplated, as allowing proponents the opportunity to try their luck in both forums.

1.8 It has never been suggested that the establishment of the DAP regime should allow 'forum shopping'.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE COMMENTS:

- (1) Nothing should prevent a proponent from attempting the same Application before the same authority within a short period of time, if the proponent wishes in good faith to have another attempt at persuading the decision-maker. That situation always existed before the DAPs were established.
- (2) A proponent should be allowed to try an Application to the other authority if a reasonable period of time has expired from the previous determination. There is no ideal time period, but 12 months would perhaps be sufficient to ensure that the fresh Application is not simply an abuse of the system.

2 Cases of forum shopping.

**3 As to Question 3:**

- 3.1 There is no basis for extending the exclusion of forum shopping.
- 3.2 The Law Society is not suggesting that the present right of a proponent to re-apply for the **same proposal** to the **same decision-maker** should be changed or restricted.
- 3.3 What the Law Society is saying is that the choice between the two options (in the optional range) should be a considered and committed choice.
- 3.4 There should be an option, not a double opportunity.
- 3.5 The double opportunity does not exist for proposals:
  - (a) of a value below \$2m or above \$10m; or
  - (b) in the excluded categories.
- 3.6 There is no reason in principle why Applicants whose proposals are in the optional range, should be the only ones who can claim the advantage of trying both the DAP option and the non-DAP option.

**Third party right of review**

**4 Response to Question 4:**

- 4.1 The point in the recommendation of a Third Party right of appeal in regard to DAP determinations is intended to deal with the effective elimination of the community representation element in the DAP regime.

- 4.2 There is no logical necessity for extending the Third Party appeal opportunity to decisions made by the local government as the community representation ideal is intact in those cases.
- 4.3 However if there is a sense of inequality in the application of the burden of Third Party Appeals, it would be better for the Third Party Appeal right to apply in all reviews, rather than that there be none at all.
- 4.4 That would bring WA into line with other Australian jurisdictions. That would also give recognition to the principle that persons who consider themselves aggrieved by a planning decision, whether they be Applicants or disadvantaged neighbours, should have an opportunity to be heard on appeal.
- 4.5 Question 4 seems to contain an error in its concern that ‘... those who make applications that must be dealt with by a DAP are not disadvantaged’. The proposal for Third Party rights of appeal should not be seen as a disadvantage to DAP Applicants, but rather as the offer of fair opportunity for Third Parties to be heard on disadvantage they perceive they will suffer if the Application is approved.

## **5 Response to Question 5:**

- 5.1 It is not ideal that the task of providing for Third Party rights of appeal in DAP appeals should be left to local governments in their planning schemes. Unless the principle is established in the DAP legislation (Part 11A of the *Planning and Development Act 2005* (WA)), or in the DAP Regulations, local governments may not adopt a uniform approach in providing for appeals in their own schemes, and some local governments may not do so in any event.
- 5.2 Considering that the WAPC and more particularly, the Minister for Planning are essential participants in the process of amending local planning schemes, if they were not required by the P & D Act, or the DAP Regulations, to acknowledge a Third Party right of appeal, then it is highly unlikely that they would allow local governments to insert Third Party appeal provisions in their schemes, particularly if they attempted to allow a right of appeal only in respect of DAP determinations.
- 5.3 To contemplate that local governments could, or would, insert Third Party appeal rights into their own schemes is not realistic. If it was a realistic proposal, then the words could be found to provide for such a right of appeal, but to the extent that the provisions of a local planning scheme were inconsistent with the appeal provisions in the DAP Regulations, the provisions in the scheme may give way to the provisions in the Regulations, considering that the P & D Act specifically provides for regulations to deal with the review of a determination of a DAP application (s.171A(2)(h)).
- 5.4 If there is to be a Third Party right of appeal, it would need to be provided for in the DAP Regulations, or in the P & D Act.

## 6 Response to Question 6:

- 6.1 It is correct that local governments are generally required under their planning schemes, when considering an application for planning approval, to have due regard to certain matters including 'the preservation of the amenity of the locality'. Such a requirement is set out in cl.10.2(n) of the Model Scheme Text in Appendix B of the *Town Planning Regulations 1967* (WA). Likewise, a local government determining a development application for the purpose of the MRS (under delegated authority from the WAPC) is required by cl.30(1) of the MRS to have regard to the preservation of the amenities of the locality. But the problem of concern is not that local governments in determining planning applications under their LPS or under the MRS, are not required to have due regard to the preservation of the amenity of the locality.
- 6.2 Nor is the point of concern that a JDAP (or LDAP) in determining a development application is not required to have due regard to the preservation of the amenity of the locality. The same obligation to have due regard to the preservation of the amenity of the locality applies to DAPs making decisions under an LPS or the MRS. The problem is in the identity of the decision-maker, and the extent to which the decision-maker can manifestly be seen to be responsible to the community whose amenity is under consideration.
- 6.3 In the case of local governments, the ultimate decision-maker is the Council, and Councils are elected by the local community. They have a responsibility to the local community, and in various ways can be required by the local community respect their views.
- 6.4 It seems to be desirable that there be a strong connection between a local community and the nature and form of development of physical structures in that community. In a study tour in May/June this year of Liveable Cities in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France and Holland, a consistent common theme in the most Liveable Cities was the extent of ownership of planning by the relevant local communities. The most successful European cities so far as liveability and sustainability are concerned, are those where there is a strong connection between the community and the planning processes within their community.
- 6.5 While decisions on planning applications are made by elected local government Council members, there is a greater prospect of connection between the community and the decision-makers than where the decisions are made by DAPs with majority independent planner membership.
- 6.6 Most of the responsiveness of a community to the planning decisions affecting the community have to do with appearances and perceptions. The establishment of the DAPs with their non-representative majority membership is likely to result in a perception that the DAPs are less responsible to the local community than an elected Council decision-maker.

**7 Response to Question 7:**

- 7.1 I have had your questions since 23 June, but was engaged in an 11 day hearing in the SAT until late in the afternoon of 26 June. I have not had an opportunity to prepare answers to your questions until the evening of 28 June. Consequently, I have not been able to research the DOP explanations of the reasons for establishing the DAPs, but my clear recollection is that a principal justification for the establishment of the DAPs was to place the decision-making responsibility for the more substantial development proposals into the hands of a decision-making body which has a majority membership of independent experts.
- 7.2 The effect of the establishment of the DAPs is to place the decision-making responsibility for the more substantial development proposals into the hands of a decision-making body which has a majority membership of independent experts. That proposition is of course subject to the fact that development proponents have an option in regard to proposals in the intermediate value range.
- 7.3 That situation is not affected by the fact that the DAP necessarily stands in the shoes of the responsible authority. Nor is it affected by the fact that the DAP is required to make its determination in accordance with the provisions of the relevant planning instrument.
- 7.4 The point of the Law Society's submission is not that the DAPs necessarily make inferior decisions, but rather that they do not, by reason of their composition, have the same level of responsibility to the community, and certainly would not be perceived by the local community to have the same level of responsibility to it as a popularly elected Council.
- 7.5 There should be no mistaken perception that the Law Society suggests that the DAPs are not competent, and that they are not able to make their decisions consistently with planning instruments under which they are required to operate. Nor is it suggested that the DAP members are not honest or competent. That is not the point of the submission.

**8 Response to Question 8:**

- 8.1 With respect, this question misses the point of the submission in para.2.11. What is being submitted in 2.11 is that the requirement that development applications be determined by Council members who are elected community representatives is the very thing that provides a high level of recognition of the community.
- 8.2 The planning legislation from its beginnings in 1928, and in its form up until the early 1990s reflected a high level of local government responsibility for planning decision-making. The progressive reduction since the 1990s of local government responsibility for planning decision-making can be demonstrated, and I can produce to the Committee an analysis of the legislative changes since the 1990s which make this change clear.
- 8.3 I should make the point incidentally that if there is a perception that Third Party rights of appeal should apply not only to DAP decisions, but to all planning decisions, that position would not be resisted by the Law Society. In fact it may well be welcomed. The Law

Society's submission in relation to Third Party appeals was generated by the call for submissions in relation to the DAP Regulations review, and it was principally in relation to that review that the Third Party review submission was made.

- 8.4 If the Committee feels that it would be more even-handed and appropriate that the Third Party right of appeal should apply to all planning decisions, that would be welcomed, and certainly would not be opposed by the Law Society.

**9 Response to Question 9:**

- 9.1 The Law Society has never attempted to submit that there is a problem with the quality of decisions made by JDAPs or the LDAP.
- 9.2 The fact that 95% of DAP decisions are made consistently with the RARs they receive is a matter which goes to the appropriateness of the DAP regime. If 95% of DAP decisions are made consistent with the RAR recommendations they receive, there has to be a very real question as to whether the DAP regime, with the expense that it involves, and the breakdown in the sense of community ownership of planning, is justified.
- 9.3 The Law Society did not perceive that it was being asked to make submissions in regard to the continuation of the DAP regime, but the statistic quoted in question 9 raises a very real question in that regard.

**10 Response to Question 10:**

- 10.1 Yes.
- 10.2 The error was mine and not the Law Society's.

**Role of local councilors**

**11 Response to Question 11:**

- 11.1 I don't believe the Law Society has given consideration to that question, but in case my views are of any interest, I will offer comment which is not necessarily the view of the Law Society as this question extends beyond the submission considered by the Council of the Law Society.
- 11.2 My personal submission is as follows:
- (a) It seems to me that the local government representatives are nominees and not delegates of their respective local governments.
  - (b) As a member of a deliberative body, the representative local Council members should make their decisions on the basis of the merits of each application coming before them, and having regard to the materials presented to them through the decision-making process.

**12 Response on Question 12:**

- 12.1 With respect, the point made by the Committee in this question is well made.
- 12.2 I believe that if reg.25 of the DAP Regulations was interpreted by a Court, the Court would be likely to hold that the term 'representatives' in reg.25(1)(a) is intended in the sense of 'nominees' rather than in the sense of 'delegates'. Once again, this is a comment by myself personally, as this issue has not been referred to the Council of the Law Society, and the Council has not expressed a view on this point.
- 12.3 In my opinion, it would be very odd if Council nominees on a deliberative body dealing with the rights of Applicants, were free to make their decisions as members of the panel otherwise than on the merits of the Application as they have been presented to the panel.
- 12.4 If it is relevant, I should make the point that in my opinion, the same obligation would apply to Council members making decisions on planning applications as members of their Council. Notwithstanding that they are elected by their local community, they have an obligation to make their determinations in accordance with the merits of the case as they have been presented to the Council, and the decision should be made consistently with planning and legal principle, and the wishes of the community must give way to the more judicially correct principles.
- 12.5 That however does not alter the fact that popularly elected Council members are likely to be perceived by the community to be more conscious of and responsive to their interests than a panel dominated by independent experts. Furthermore, the sense of community ownership of planning decisions is likely to be increased by the sense of the community that they can seek an explanation of an unpopular planning decision from the elected representatives, and can demonstrate their response at the ballot box. That is all part and parcel of the notion of community responsibility, and community ownership of the planning process.

**DAP decisions in secret**

**13 Response on Question 13:**

- 13.1 Again, it should be emphasised that the Law Society Council has not had an opportunity to consider question 13, and the answers attempted by me have to be seen as my answers, and not answers of the Law Society.
- 13.2 To the extent that my views are relevant to the Committee, I make the following points regarding Council consideration of matters arising out of SAT mediation:
- (a) Under the *Local Government Act 1995 (WA) (LG Act)*, a Council is required to hold its meetings in public (LG Act s.5.23).

- (b) A Council can go behind closed doors to consider matters which, for instance, arise from legal advice relating to SAT mediation proceedings.
  - (c) However a Council can only go behind closed doors if a motion is moved by a Council member to that effect, and is supported by a majority of the Council. Consequently, the SAT cannot expect that a Council will always discuss matters arising in mediation, behind closed doors.
  - (d) Although I cannot at this time refer to the source of this information, it is my understanding that the SAT has recognised that a local government Council, acting properly, may not be able to discuss mediation related matters behind closed doors. To that extent, the local government Council would not be necessarily held to the obligation of confidentiality.
- 13.3 So far as DAP meetings are concerned, reg.40(2) provides that any DAP meeting to determine a development application is to be open to the public. There is an exception to that in reg.40(4), where the DAP is determining an application under reg.17. Otherwise, the CEO may issue practice notes about the practice and procedure of DAPs, pursuant to reg.40(5). I do not at the time of making these comments have available to me the CEO's practice notes, but they may provide for the DAP to go behind closed doors in certain circumstances. If they do, that would place a DAP on all fours with a local government Council in that regard.
- 13.4 Quite apart from the above comments, as a matter of general comment, in my view it would assist the deliberations of a planning decision-making body, and would be consistent with the normal practice of the SAT, if the decision-making body was able to consider matters related to SAT mediations, behind closed doors.
- 13.5 At the same time however, I recognise the desirability of local government Councils, and DAPs exercising the powers of local government Councils in planning decision-making, should undertake their deliberations and make their decisions in public, so as to foster the element of community ownership of the planning processes in their community.

#### **DAP members representing developers**

#### **14 Response on Question 14:**

- 14.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not been able to consider this question, and any comments herein are my personal comments. The Committee can ignore them or accept them as such.
- 14.2 I have no doubt that many, and probably the great majority of the independent expert members of the DAPs are competent, sincere and responsible people undertaking a difficult task with poor remuneration, to the best of their abilities.
- 14.3 Notwithstanding that, one of the faults of the DAP regime which I have perceived is the potential for members of the community to lose faith in the DAP process by reason of the



- fact that many DAP members are not only performing the responsibility of decision-makers on what are often very sensitive community issues, but they also from time to time either may have been, or in the future may be, paid consultants to, or even employees, of the proponents of controversial applications coming before the DAPs.
- 14.4 At the very least, no DAP member should be allowed to deal with an application which comes from a person or company which the DAP member at any time has advised, or even in a situation where the DAP member has advised a company or person in a group related to an Applicant for a DAP determination.
- 14.5 The problem in relation to subsequent representation of Applicants for DAP approvals is much more difficult. But it is a matter which can seriously affect community perceptions, and the community's trust in the DAP process. If a person who made a decision on a controversial DAP Application is later seen by the community to be in any way acting for or in the interest of the proponent of the controversial Application, then the community's faith in the DAP system is likely to be severely damaged, as would the credibility of the DAP regime itself.
- 14.6 The most appropriate DAP independent expert members are those who have completely retired from planning practice. A number of independent DAP expert members are in that category, and they appear to provide sound and conscientious contributions to the DAP process. However even in those cases, members of the community may be able to trace some history of connection between the independent expert in the past with a proponent for a DAP planning approval. That situation is an almost unavoidable consequence of the requirement for three independent expert members on every JDAP or LDAP panel, and a consequence also of the fact that the population of competent and appropriate independent experts for DAP panels in WA is limited.

### **Valuing of applications to achieve DAP threshold**

#### **15 Response on Question 15:**

- 15.1 I have no doubt that the valuing of Applications is subject to manipulations by Applicants. However that has always been the case. Considering that the Application fee for any Development Application depends on the value of the Application, there has always been a strong tendency for Applicants to devalue their proposals.
- 15.2 There is also no doubt in my mind that there would be cases where proponents for planning approvals would increase the value of their Applications so as to fall within the category of a DAP option. I know of one case where an Applicant adopted a high valuation for his development proposal so as to ensure that his proposal would be considered by the DAP, simply because he wished to avoid embarrassment to the Councillors of the responsible local government who might be perceived by the public as being friendly towards him.
- 15.3 There would be clear advantages in having an independent valuation of Applications, but it would be expensive, troublesome and time-consuming, and I don't think the extra

trouble and expense would be justified. The better course would be for the responsible local government officers to continue to exercise some control by forming their own judgments on the valuation of an Application, and ensuring that blatant cases of manipulation do not occur. I believe it would be open to a local government officer who believes that there has been a blatant undervalue or overvaluing of an application to require that the valuation at least be confirmed by the Applicant's architect/designer/engineer.

**16 Response on Question 16:**

- 16.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not had an opportunity to consider this question, so any response is my own.
- 16.2 It wouldn't be surprising if an Applicant did stage a development process to avoid going to a DAP, considering that Applications dealt with by DAPs are subject to higher fees.
- 16.3 Although I do not know of any specific case of this occurring, it would not be surprising if an Applicant who is confident that the responsible local government would deal with his Application on its merits, would divide an Application into stages and thereby avoid the extra expense of DAP application fees. However I don't see that as being a manipulation of the system. If an application can be presented in stages, there is no reason why a developer should not do so. In many cases, developers don't have any practical alternative other than to present their developments in stages, consistent with the financial arrangements they are able to make with their bankers.

**Lack of reasons for failing to follow RAR recommendation/deemed-to-comply provisions**

**17 Response on Question 17:**

- 17.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not been able to consider this question, and the comments on this question are my own and not comments of the Law Society.
- 17.2 It is reprehensible for a DAP to fail to give reasons for its decision, whether they be for approval or refusal.
- 17.3 It is particularly inappropriate for a DAP to fail to give reasons for its decisions where it fails to decide in accordance with the recommendations in an RAR.
- 17.4 A local government Council in making a decision on an application is required to give reasons if it does not follow the recommendations of its reporting officers. I have not had time to check the DAP Regulations or any directions given by the CEO as to the required practice of DAPs. However there is no reason why a DAP should be excused from giving full and clear reasons for its decision where it fails to follow the recommendation of the RAR.

- 17.5 The possibility of this occurring is a strong reason for supporting third party appeals, whether they be related only to DAP decisions, or whether they be more generally applied to the decisions of all planning decision-makers.

**18 Response on Question 18:**

- 18.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not considered question 18, and my responses to that question are my own comments and not those of the Law Society.
- 18.2 For practical purposes, reasons for decision are of particular importance where there is a refusal of an Application, as the refusal may be taken on appeal, or may be the subject of judicial review, and the absence of reasons in those circumstances will be noted and will reflect unfavourably on the decision-maker. Where an Application is approved however, there can presently be no application for review to the SAT, and the absence of reasons is only likely to have consequences if the decision is taken on review to the Supreme Court by a concerned objector.
- 18.3 It is not clear to me however that a DAP's decision-making process are unfettered or without justification or scrutiny. Under reg.16(1), it is provided –

‘The provisions of the Act and the planning instrument under which a DAP application is made apply to the making and notification of a determination by a DAP to which the application is given under regulation 11 as if the DAP were the responsible authority in relation to the planning instrument.’

That suggests to me that the DAP would be required to comply with any provision of a planning scheme which deal with the intended procedures of the responsible local government.

**Exercise of discretionary powers**

**19 Response on Question 19:**

- 19.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not considered question 19, and my responses to that question are my own comments and not those of the Law Society.
- 19.2 If there are to be DAPs, to have limitation on the jurisdiction of the DAP may be artificial and lead to complications.
- 19.3 Having said that, there seems to be a sound basis for arguing that DAP decisions should be limited to issues which do not cause significant changes in local government planning policies.

**20 Response on Question 20:**

- 20.1 I have to say again that the Council of the Law Society has not considered this question, and the responses are my responses.

- 20.2 I can't see that it would be open to a DAP to ignore the zoning of subject land under the relevant local planning scheme, or a region planning scheme. The provisions of a local planning scheme have the same effect as if enacted in the P & D Act (see s.87(4) of the P & D Act). The zoning provisions under an LPS are provisions of the scheme, and consequently are binding on a DAP. If a DAP was to make a decision in effect purporting to rezone land, that decision would be subject to correction in the SAT if it was a decision to refuse an Application, or in the Supreme Court if the decision was to approve, and if there was any objector with sufficient resources and interest to take the matter to the Supreme Court.

### **Delays in the process**

#### **21 Response on Question 21:**

- 21.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not considered this question, and the responses are my personal responses.
- 21.2 I believe that I know of at least one case where an Application was made to the SAT for review of a JDAP decision based on a deemed refusal. Due to the short time that I have had to consider these questions, I have not been able to confirm the circumstances of that review. However if there were cases of appeals against deemed refusals by a DAP, that would not be surprising, and would not necessarily involve a condemnation of the DAP. Some Applications are particularly complex, and the time allowed under a planning scheme for determination will often not be adequate.
- 21.3 It would not be surprising if there were greater delays in the DAP process than where decision-making is by the local government. That is partly due to the fact that the great majority of planning decisions by the majority of local governments are made under delegated authority by officers, and within the shortest possible timeframe. One of the greatest criticisms of the DAP regime is that it removes the tremendous convenience of planning decision-making by officers of a local government under delegated authority. An extremely high proportion of planning decisions by local governments are made by its responsible officers under delegated authority.
- 21.4 I have no comment to make on the issue of delay by DAPs, other than that the deemed refusal process is probably adequate. A broadening of the deemed refusal process may be necessary if there were to be Third Party appeals, as a deemed refusal would not provide a basis for a Third Party to appeal.
- 21.5 The point does however raise the issue of representation in SAT reviews. If Third Party appeal rights were recognised, then the circumstances in which the SAT could allow Third Party intervention would need to be significantly widened. The SAT at the present time takes a very restrictive approach to the acceptance of Third Party interveners in SAT reviews.

### **Level of DAP thresholds**

#### **22 Response on Question 22:**

- 22.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not considered this issue, and any comments made on this issue are my personal comments.
- 22.2 In an era when a modest office development of approximately 500m<sup>2</sup> in net lettable area is likely to exceed the present JDAP opt in threshold of \$2m, the threshold in my view is too low, and involves an unnecessary complication of the planning process in respect of developments which are not significant.

#### **23 Response on Question 23:**

- 23.1 Again, the Council of the Law Society has not considered this question and any comments are my personal comments.
- 23.2 Given that I have difficulty in seeing any justification for the introduction of the DAP regime in WA, my inclination would be to suggest a very high threshold for a DAP 'opt in'.

### **Amendment of DAP Regulations 2015**

#### **24 Response on Question 24:**

- 24.1 The Council of the Law Society has not considered this question and any comments must be treated as my personal comments and not expressing the views of the Law Society.
- 24.2 For reasons which must be apparent from the preceding comments, the lowering of the 'opt in' threshold to \$2m was unnecessary, and is likely to encumber the processes in WA for determination of planning applications. There is a potential for the work of DAPs to increase beyond the capacity of the planning community to provide appropriate independent experts.
- 24.3 The disbanding of the short-list working group may have the consequence that the primary responsibility for the choice of DAP members falls upon the Minister and those closely advising him. That will result in a reduction in the transparency of the system and could give rise to a perception that the DAP regime was established for the development industry and is maintained for the benefit of the development industry, and is excessively subject to the patronage of the development industry through, amongst other things, the significant contributions to political party funds made by the development industry.
- 24.4 The change to the minimum quorum requirement, allowing for the possibility of DAPs being constituted by only the three 'independent' 'experts' is likely to increase the public perception of a clear disconnection between the DAP decision-making processes and concern for community interests.

- 24.5 A 'stop the clock' mechanism would be useful in all circumstances of planning decision-making, as local governments frequently have insufficient time to make a responsible decision within 60 days after receiving an application, or 90 days where advertising is required. The time limits in reg.12(3) can be equally unrealistic, particularly in cases where a local government has adopted a practice of requiring that the RAR be approved by the Council, consistent with the description of the role of the Council in s.2.7 of the LG Act –

'2.7(1) The Council –

- (a) ...
- (b) is responsible for the performance of the local government's functions.'

I believe it is clear that it is the Council which should provide the RAR to a DAP, and if a local government adopts that approach, then the time limits for the local government role are unrealistic.

- 24.6 The point made in the final dot point to question 24 is very pertinent. It is not reasonable for the consent of the Applicant to be required in those circumstances, for the presiding member to extend time.