

OPENING STATEMENT OF MARY GADAMS DATED 2 MAY 2012

ON BEHALF OF RACINGTHEPLANET EVENTS LIMITED

**TO THE ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE – INQUIRY INTO
THE 2011 KIMBERLEY ULTRAMARATHON**

1. Mr Chair, Committee Members. I appear before this Committee voluntarily. I was a competitor in the race. I was injured by fire on 2 September 2011. I am here representing RacingThePlanet Events.
2. Like you, I am shocked and upset by the injuries suffered by competitors in the race. Like you, I am particularly distressed by the injuries of Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson. We do not take lightly any injury in our footraces.
3. Any witness to a parliamentary committee approaches giving evidence with apprehension. My apprehension is probably greater than most. Two young sportswomen have been seriously injured. It is understandable that they, and we, find their experience distressing and horrifying. Notwithstanding these tragic outcomes, the facts are that the preparations for the 2011 footrace were careful, conducted over a long period and met government requirements.
4. I am concerned that RacingThePlanet faces a wall of prejudice that makes communicating some facts very, very difficult.
5. However, the Committee must impartially inquire into the conduct of the footrace and make findings based on the evidence you receive. The conclusions you reach will have far-reaching consequences.
6. I have come to this hearing to give my evidence. I ask that you listen to it with an open mind and draw your conclusions based on the evidence, and not on first prejudices.
7. Several witnesses have said they want to know the truth. The truth is that there is no convenient villain to make sense of this tragedy.

8. I will summarise, *first*, the risk of fire in the Kimberley, *second*, the very considerable preparations undertaken by RacingThePlanet for the footrace, *third*, the response during the footrace, *fourth*, the quality of the medical care administered, *fifth*, the evacuation procedures, and, *sixth*, the proposed law reforms.

FIRE RISK ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2011

9. The following is a direct quote from the current guide to fire in the Kimberley published by FESA:

When visitors first see bush fires in the north of Australia it can come as something of a shock—fires and smoke seem common, fire trucks are rare and the country is often burnt and black for many kilometres. Bush fires are a natural part of the savannah landscape in the north of Australia. Is there risk from bush fires? In most cases no — provided you respect the fire and follow basic fire awareness. These fires are usually much less intense than the bush fires of southern Australia. This is because the vegetation types are different and the level of fuel available to burn is lower.¹

10. That advice remains unchanged since May 2008. It is consistent with the views given to RacingThePlanet when it prepared for the race, the advice which continues to be given by the government today, and with the evidence as to general fire risk in the Kimberley given to this Committee.
11. FESA go on to state that fires “can” be more dangerous and hotter in the late dry season (July to November), when the grass and tree litter is drier.
12. The right question is: Was there a risk of dangerous fire on the day of the race?

¹ The FESA brochure titled "Bush Fires in the North of Australia Information For Travellers" (http://www.fesa.wa.gov.au/safetyinformation/fire/bushfire/BushfireManualsandGuides/FESA-Bushfire-Bushfires_in_Northern_Australia.pdf)

13. On 2 September 2011 – the day of the race - the fire danger index published by FESA was "Low Moderate". That is the lowest of the 6 fire danger levels on the scale used by FESA. No fire ban applied. No specific (or general) fire risk warning was issued.
14. The Committee has heard evidence from two Kimberley local witnesses (including the former Shire President) that September was the optimum time to conduct the footrace in the region.
15. RacingThePlanet staff and the course director were aware of smoke and some small spot fires near the course in the days prior to the race. They investigated each of those incidents. In all but one case, those fires had been extinguished by the day of the footrace.
16. In that single exception, there was a fire of the sort identified by FESA: a low intensity spot fire. And there was a fire barrier – a two lane road between that fire and the nearby footrace course. *That* fire was northwest of the Tier Gorge.
17. As the Committee knows from the video record, RacingThePlanet warned of fire as the first item at the prerace briefing.
18. FESA's evidence to the Committee is that the fire which injured competitors on 2 September came from the *opposite* direction to the observed fires. It came from the south-east. FESA does not know the cause of the fire.
19. According to FESA that fire from the south-east "meandered with a slow rate of spread throughout the region". That is a direct quote from FESA. The origin of that fire was some 12.5 kilometres away. FESA's report states that on 2 September – after the race was underway- the fire "increased in intensity travelling quickly", and passed through the Tier gorge from East to West. That is, towards the competitors.
20. Nine of 41 competitors made their way through the Tier Gorge *prior* to the fire. The difference between those competitors who made it safely through and the injured competitors was only 10 minutes.

21. FESA say that the path and severity of that fire was not predictable. The fire came from a long way away. It spared 36 competitors, and it injured 5.
22. RacingThePlanet works very hard to control and minimise risks on its footraces. We are – I am – shocked and saddened that the competitors were injured. If RacingThePlanet knew, prior to the race, that such a fire would pass through the Tier Gorge with that intensity, at that time, of course it would not have conducted the race in that location.
23. I believe that this fire could not have been anticipated by RacingThePlanet from the information available at the start of the footrace. The Committee has heard from local land owners that this fire had a very different quality to the fires which they ordinarily experience. Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson have testified to a wall of fire. What I saw was an intense and fast moving fire. It was not a type of fire which anybody expected on 2 September.
24. I will now turn to RacingThePlanet's risk management plan.

RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

25. RacingThePlanet had a thorough risk management plan in place for the 2011 footrace. That report had more than 150 pages. RacingThePlanet's written submission contains a detailed overview of its contents.
26. The risk management plan was in existence many months before the Kimberley footrace, and was first formulated in January 2011. Prior to every footrace RacingThePlanet identifies the risks associated with organising the footrace and continually makes adjustments to the risk management plan to take those risks into account. The suggestion that the plan was prepared at the last minute, or was not available to local agencies, is not true.
27. No government agency ever requested a copy of the risk management plan prior to the footrace. RacingThePlanet would have welcomed the opportunity for government agencies to review and comment on the plan, and would have

provided a copy of it had it been requested. The evidence of some agencies can be contrasted with what agencies actually did at the time.

28. Each checkpoint captain had a summary of the risk management plan during the footrace and responded quickly and effectively, in accordance with the plan, when he or she became aware that competitors were affected by fire. In particular, RacingThePlanet:
- (a) telephoned emergency services at 2pm, which was minutes after it had been told about possible injured competitors by Mr Croot;
 - (b) held competitors at key checkpoints;
 - (c) set up a temporary checkpoint at the barrels between checkpoint 2 and checkpoint 3;
 - (d) instructed the pilot of the Heliwork helicopter on the course to fly over the Tier Gorge to assess the situation;
 - (e) when the Heliwork helicopter returned to checkpoint 3 to report the location and apparent condition of injured competitors, a RacingThePlanet doctor was immediately taken by that helicopter to the injured competitors;
 - (f) directed staff, doctors and volunteers to go to the injured competitors, and to provide aid and assistance, and to evacuate them;
 - (g) called in a second helicopter when the helicopter couldn't land where the injured competitors were located. RacingThePlanet has telephone records showing that this call was made to Heliwork from one of its satellite phones at 3.26pm;
 - (h) evacuated injured competitors to the nearest hospital; and
 - (i) cancelled the race.
29. RacingThePlanet did not rely on the government to evacuate injured competitors. That was the correct choice: had we waited, help would not have come in time.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH AGENCIES AND LAND OCCUPIERS

30. I will now turn to the communications RacingThePlanet had with government agencies and land occupiers before the footrace.
31. RacingThePlanet began planning and preparing for the 2011 Kimberley footrace from when the 2010 Kimberley footrace was completed.
32. As set out in RacingThePlanet's submissions, the relevant land owners and relevant government departments were aware of the 2011 footrace, being:
 1. DEC in Kununurra;
 2. the Police in Kununurra (who were provided details about the footrace including start time and place, finish time and place, and the location of the footrace course);
 3. the Police in Perth (who gave permission to RacingThePlanet to cross the Kununurra Bridge during the footrace);
 4. FESA, through the Kununurra Visitors Centre and WA Health;
 5. the Kununurra Hospital;
 6. the Shire of Wyndham/East Kimberley;
 7. the Kununurra Visitors Centre;
 8. Eventscorp;
 9. WA Health which provided a 'special event exemption' giving formal permission to the 3 doctors from the United States and one from Canada to practise medicine during the 2011 footrace. WA Health notified a number of people in their department, the Royal Flying Doctor Service and the Manager of the State Ambulance Service about the 2011 footrace; and
 10. the Department of Indigenous Affairs.

33. Some government agencies have complained that, although they knew of the footrace, they did not receive the information in their preferred manner. Some complain that information which they never requested was not provided to them.
34. WA Health told the Committee that it was "not forwarded any risk assessment or medical plan document to review". WA Health did not ask for those documents. In fact, RacingThePlanet wrote to the Department on 26 January 2011 and asked:
- (a) Is there any information you would like us to provide or anyone we should inform before this footrace?
 - (b) Is there anything else that we need to do from a medical standpoint in order to stage this footrace?
35. The only response to that request was a letter from the WA Health on 12 April 2011 which recommended that we notify Local Government, Police, WA Health, DEC, and the Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor. RacingThePlanet either already had or did notify each of these agencies except the Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor (which was not relevant to the footrace). FESA is not on the list.
36. There is no doubt that FESA was aware of the 2011 footrace well before it started. From 14 February 2011 it had been notified through its role on the WA Health Subcommittee.
37. FESA gave evidence that the Kununurra Visitor Centre treat the request of RacingThePlanet notified FESA of the footrace.
38. RacingThePlanet received an email from the Kununurra Visitor Centre on 31 August 2012 stating that they had spoken to Tony Stevenson from FESA on 30 August and notified him about the footrace. The suggestion he made was that RacingThePlanet notify the following organisations about the footrace:
- (a) Kununurra Hospital;
 - (b) St John's Ambulance;

- (c) the Chemist in Kununurra; and
 - (d) Heliwork.
39. RacingThePlanet either already had, or did, notify each of those prior to the footrace.
40. Mr Stevenson requested a map of the race area. This request was the only government request with which RacingThePlanet did not promptly comply (quite inadvertently).
41. When notified of the emergency situation on the day of the footrace, that there was a fire, people were missing and possibly injured, FESA did not respond to multiple emergency calls from RacingThePlanet starting at 2.02 pm. Mr Stevenson did not give evidence to this Committee.
42. It has been suggested that RacingThePlanet should have notified the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC). RacingThePlanet was not informed of the existence of that Committee but most, if not all, of its members were organisations that RacingThePlanet had *already* notified about the footrace.
43. It is apparent from RacingThePlanet's experience, and from the evidence given to the Committee, that there is a lack of co-ordination and communication between government agencies.
44. Although many agencies say that they should have been provided with copies of the risk management plan, they cannot point to any request or requirement to do so. With one exception, none have identified what they would have done with that plan which would have altered the outcome on 2 September 2011.
45. The FESA evidence is that had Tony Stevenson been given a map and the risk management plan FESA, would have recommended that the race be cancelled or run entirely on roads. It does not appear from the evidence that that approach was adopted with other sporting events which took place in the region at about the same time. For example, FESA appears to have been the supporter of an

adventure race one month later called the "Lake Argyle Adventure Race" which included a 40kilometre mountain bike ride and 10 kilometre run off-road.

COMMUNICATIONS

46. I will now turn to RacingThePlanet's communications during the footrace.
47. The Committee should understand the communications infrastructure which RacingThePlanet put in place.
48. Because RacingThePlanet conducts races in remote locations throughout the world, it owns and uses state of the art mobile phones, satellite phones, Broadband Global Area Network phones (BGANs) and radios. RacingThePlanet staff have extensive experience with using this equipment.
49. RacingThePlanet had a communication plan under which:
 - (a) satellite phones were the primary means of communication;
 - (b) radio was the short-distance means of communication; and
 - (c) Nokia or Blackberry calling and email was designated as a third means of communication around Kununurra. (There is no mobile phone reception outside of Kununurra.)
50. Having conducted a footrace in the Kimberley in 2010, RacingThePlanet had firsthand experience of the difficulties with communications in the area and came further prepared in 2011.
51. For the 2011 footrace, we had 8 satellite phones, of which four were Iridium, 2 were BGAN and 2 locally sourced Thuraya phones. That is, RacingThePlanet had access to three separate satellite networks. All of those phones were operating on the day of the race.
52. RacingThePlanet had a satellite phone at every checkpoint on the course including checkpoint 3. It was with such a phone that the captain at checkpoint 2 made the first emergency call.

53. The risk management plan included a list with contact details of all mobile phones, satellite radios, and key local services. A list was provided to all checkpoint captains and volunteers on the course.
54. No satellite phone has the same reliability that city dwellers expect of land lines. Satellite phones require a direct line of sight between the phone and the satellite and any interference will impair call quality. This is not a deficiency of RacingThePlanet's phones. This is the nature of all satellite phones, as Mr Jacoby's written submission makes clear.
55. Radios are of limited utility because of the vast distances and the need for line of sight to communicate by radio.
56. A number of people who have given submissions or evidence to the Committee have been critical of RacingThePlanet's communications. No one has suggested any viable alternatives or solutions.
57. RacingThePlanet sought to implement, and did implement, the most reliable communications methods available. There is no clear or expert evidence to the contrary given to this committee.
58. If the West Australian Government is serious about improving remote location communications, a solution adopted by other governments is to install mobile telephone broadcast towers in those areas.
59. Mr John Storey has a UHF radio in his gyrocopter. This would enable him to communicate with other UHF radios on the same channel. However, RacingThePlanet did not expect or arrange that Mr Storey would play any role after the start of the race. He was travelling home and it was by chance that he saw a fire.
60. FESA gave evidence that the first 000 call received at 2.02 pm was confused. In particular, that a GPS location of the injured competitors could not be given. The GPS coordinates of each checkpoint were well known. Minutes after RacingThePlanet had been told that there were likely injuries, we did not know

the GPS coordinates of the injured *competitors*. RacingThePlanet did not wait until it had specific GPS coordinates; instead it immediately informed emergency services that there was a likely injury. That was not confusion; rather, it was a proper and immediate notification to call in a rescue. RacingThePlanet would today make an emergency call as it did, at the first report of injury. It would not wait until all information was known.

WARNINGS OF FIRE

61. I now turn to the allegations that RacingThePlanet ignored warnings of fire.
62. The first message of fire was originally received from John Storey but passed onto RacingThePlanet's medical director from the media helicopter.
63. When Mr Storey's message was received, RacingThePlanet's course director went to check the fire which he had been monitoring near the Gibb River Road. He established that that fire posed no threat to competitors. RacingThePlanet was not aware, at that time, of any fire approaching the north east end of the Tier Gorge.
64. The media helicopter crew, who had transmitted the message, did not appear to understand that message was urgent; they then proceeded to film the course as they had been doing.
65. The second message was given by two competitors on the course at the Barrels midway between checkpoints 2 and 3. Although the Barrels was not an official checkpoint, RacingThePlanet had posted a staff member there at that time to review the competitors coming out of the Tier gorge. When the staff member received this message she called checkpoint 2 on her satellite phone but was unable to connect. She promptly drove to checkpoint 2. That drive took approximately 30 minutes. She departed at between 12:45 and 1 pm.
66. At about that time, RacingThePlanet observed smoke near the northern part of the Tier Range and requested a local volunteer to check the course from checkpoint 2 to checkpoint 3.

67. A further conversation between a competitor and a volunteer at checkpoint 3, on video provided to the Committee, did not suggest the intense fire that subsequently occurred.

MEDICAL CARE

68. I now turn to the medical care provided.
69. It is necessary to respond to the evidence given of Mr Sarel de Koker, a St John's Ambulance paramedic based in Kununurra, who assisted with the rescue of Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson.
70. Mr de Koker arrived at the site, only 10 – 15 minutes prior to the helicopter rescue. Although he gives evidence about what happened prior to his arrival, he does not have direct knowledge of what happened at that time.
71. Dr Julie Brahm was the first doctor on site. She jumped from the first responder helicopter to the ledge where Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson were located. Dr Brahm is a Canadian qualified physician who was granted a formal permission to practice medicine during the 2011 footrace.
72. Dr Brahm inserted a saline intravenous drip into Ms Sanderson and provided her with 3 litres of fluid while waiting to be rescued. As she was given fluid intravenously, Ms Sanderson did not require oral hydration.
73. Dr Brahm was unable to insert an intravenous drip into Ms Pitt given her injuries and swelling. She was given a small quantity of water but Dr Brahm was concerned that Ms Pitt not consume too much water because of the risk of aspiration during her likely need for intubation once at the hospital. At the hospital, Ms Pitt was given an intraosseous infusion which I understand is the process of injecting directly into the marrow of a bone to provide a non-collapsible entry point into the systemic venous system. This technique is used in clinical emergency situations to provide fluids and medication when intravenous access is not feasible.

74. Dr Brahm was carrying ample supplies of water and intravenous fluids. It is not true that she had only one IV bag.
75. RacingThePlanet's medical director had the following pain medications available on the course: aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, valium, vicodin and Tylenol with codeine. Dr Brahm was carrying a medical bag which included Tylenol with codeine. Dr Brahm administered pain relief medication orally to Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson.
76. RacingThePlanet and its doctors do not have controlled analgesic drugs such as fentanyl, ketamine or morphine on site during a footrace. Those are controlled drugs under West Australian law. To do so would require risk management processes in relation to their safe storage and administration, which would not be practicable given the remote environments where the footrace was conducted.
77. Dr Brahm did not dress the wounds, primarily because of the lack of analgesia and because Ms Sanderson's and Ms Pitt's burns were not free from debris; that would need debridement at the hospital. The focus was on rehydrating with IV fluids where that was possible (as with Ms Sanderson) and evacuating them to the hospital.
78. Dr Brahm sought to cover Ms Sanderson and Ms Pitt with another space blanket directly (as well as keeping the one that was already hanging up to shield them from the sun) because she was concerned about heat and hydration loss through the burns, but neither patient would tolerate the material touching her burns due to pain.
79. Dr Brahm did not cool the wounds given the time at which she arrived on scene. Cooling wounds initially, when the tissue was hot, may have been of some benefit. However, by the time Dr Brahm arrived, it would not have made a difference to the recovery of Ms Pitt or Ms Sanderson. Evacuating Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson as quickly as possible was most important to their healthcare outcomes.

80. Dr Brahm works on a full-time basis in medical evacuations by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft (the latter with the Royal Flying Doctor Service). Dr Brahm has been trained in helicopter recovery.
81. There are obvious dangers in the Committee drawing conclusions about the adequacy of medical care in the absence of any direct evidence from qualified physicians. I am unaware that the Committee has received or called evidence from any physicians.
82. I now turn to the evacuation of injured competitors.

HELICOPTER EVACUATION

83. RacingThePlanet had arranged with Heliwork that the helicopter on site would be used as a rescue helicopter and would be the first responder if needed.
84. I personally visited Heliwork during my due diligence for the 2010 event. I assessed and considered their rescue capabilities.
85. When RacingThePlanet first discussed helicopters for evacuation with Heliwork for the 2011 footrace, we were advised that the helicopter used by the media would be the usual one sent out in an emergency. As this helicopter would already be on the course, the logical decision was to designate this helicopter as the first responder, as was done. There was no reason to have a second idle helicopter.
86. I have competed in and organized a very large number of races over some 20 years and I am not aware of any similar race that has 2 helicopters on standby. It is common to have none. No evidence to the Committee suggested otherwise.
87. RacingThePlanet's risk management plan concerned a footrace course that, save for two short sections, was entirely on road or 4x4 track. The site where the rescue took place was not on the course but on a steep, elevated, rocky ledge some distance from the course. This made the rescue significantly more

difficult. Notwithstanding those circumstances, RacingThePlanet did request and effect the evacuation of injured competitors from that location.

DEHYDRATION IN THE 2010 EVENT

88. I turn briefly to dehydration in the 2010 footrace.
89. Almost every footrace around the world has dehydration issues. The most recent Boston Marathon had hundreds of cases because of the heat of the day.
90. We told competitors on a number of occasions before the race of the importance of hydration. Plentiful supplies of bottled water were available at each checkpoint. Throughout the race competitors were urged to hydrate.
91. The Committee has received evidence from witnesses attending the 2010 footrace that the dehydration advice was given clearly by RacingThePlanet, but was not followed by some competitors.
92. During the 2010 Kimberley race, all the competitors who required IVs for dehydration on Day 1 were treated with IV fluid provided by RacingThePlanet.

ALLEGATIONS ABOUT RACING THE PLANET

93. I now turn to 6 serious allegations that have been made about RacingThePlanet.
94. *First*, there have been suggestions that RacingThePlanet left Western Australia and somehow evaded its responsibilities to give statements and report to government authorities. Those suggestions are untrue.
95. RacingThePlanet has responded to, and cooperated with, each inquiry made of it by every government authority which sought information from it.
96. RacingThePlanet's representatives have come to Perth or Kununurra on at least 5 occasions since 2 September 2011 in relation to the footrace. It has responded to this Committee's request comprehensively. I am appearing today. RacingThePlanet will continue its comprehensive cooperation with Western Australian authorities.

97. *Second*, Mr Waters, representing FESA, gave evidence to the Committee that the RacingThePlanet risk management plan may have been created or amended after the event, and that FESA had doubts as to its date of creation, based on the properties in the electronic documents received.
98. In fact, RacingThePlanet's risk management plan was prepared long before the footrace. The Adobe PDF document sent to FESA bears the date of the copy that was created and given to FESA.
99. *Third*, there have been a number of allegations that RacingThePlanet took "short cuts" with precautions and preparations for the Kimberley race. Those allegations are without any foundation. RacingThePlanet had 22 staff and volunteers for 41 competitors, including four highly qualified doctors. That is one doctor for every ten competitors. The race preparations were careful and thorough.
100. *Fourth*, there have been suggestions that RacingThePlanet is indifferent to the injuries of the competitors hurt in the Tier Gorge.
101. We are not. We are very concerned about those competitors.
102. RacingThePlanet has offered to meet with the injured competitors and their families. I have personally met with one family member. I remain prepared to do so, if the competitors wish. That offer has been taken up by the family of one competitor. That offer remains open.
103. What can be said is that most of the material presented to the Committee by the injured competitors has never been previously provided to RacingThePlanet.
104. Discussions between injured competitors and RacingThePlanet are entirely irrelevant to RacingThePlanet's preparation for, and conduct of, the race. They are not the subject of any term of reference of this inquiry.

105. It is not helpful to go beyond this, save that the Committee may assume that RacingThePlanet remains concerned to co-operate with, and assist, the injured competitors.
106. *Fifth*, all of RacingThePlanet's staff are fluent English speakers. Despite numerous questions seeking to elicit different answers, the overwhelming body of evidence received by the Committee is that the staff and volunteers were proficient English speakers, as they were.
107. *Sixth*, some significance appears to be attributed to the change of direction of the footrace from east-west to west-east. There is none. The change of course direction was decided by 2 February 2011, 7 months before footrace began. The change was made because RacingThePlanet did not want competitors to be travelling over broken ground at night. There is more broken ground at the western end of the course than at the eastern end. Since the race began in the morning, and because competitors tend to spread out over time, it was safest to have the broken ground section of the race at the beginning, rather than at the end.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002

108. I now turn to the proposals for statutory amendment.
109. The West Australian parliament passed and amended the 2002 Civil Liability Act with the purpose of reducing uncertainty in the law by limiting liability for recreational activities. Two members of the Committee were members of the parliament that passed and amended that Act.
110. There is a submission that the Civil Liability Act should be retrospectively amended so as to remove the effect of that Act for RacingThePlanet.
111. Whatever view the Committee takes of the legislation there is an obvious difficulty with amending an Act so as to change the rules after the event. There is also an obvious unfairness with passing an amendment which is designed to affect only one person.

CONCLUSION

112. I have been involved in sporting events most of my life. In addition to setting up RacingThePlanet I have competed in more than 60 marathons and many ultramarathons. It is not possible to eliminate all risks from remote footraces.
113. I greatly regret the injuries that occurred in 2011, particularly those that occurred to Ms Pitt and Ms Sanderson.
114. The preparations of RacingThePlanet for the 2011 footrace were careful, conducted over a long period and responded to the government's requirements. The race was well staffed and carefully conducted. Without the risk management planning conducted by RacingThePlanet, the helicopters it engaged, the doctors it provided and the evacuation of injured competitors it coordinated, the consequences on 2 September 2011 would have been much worse.