

*Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission — Eleventh Report —  
“Parliamentary Inspector’s Report on ‘a Saga of Persistence’” — Motion*

Resumed from 4 September on the following motion moved by Hon Alison Xamon —

That the report be noted.

**Hon NICK GOIRAN:** I would like to contribute to the motion that we note the eleventh report by the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission. The title of this report, “Parliamentary Inspector’s Report on ‘a Saga of Persistence’”, immediately piques my interest. When I quickly reviewed the chair’s foreword—the chair of this committee obviously being my learned friend the member for Girrawheen, Margaret Quirk, MLA—I thought that this episode with the Corruption and Crime Commission sounded awfully familiar. I draw to members’ attention a portion of the chair’s foreword in which the chair sets out that the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission’s report draws the attention of the joint standing committee to certain matters. The one that interests me is the first, and it is neatly summarised by the chair in the foreword in the following paragraph. Referring to the parliamentary inspector, she says —

He uses the first case to demonstrate an issue which can, and does, arise in the coordination of the roles of the Commission and the Parliamentary Inspector. It illustrates a situation where the exercise of the Commission’s industrial powers under section 196(9) of the Act had the effect of frustrating the capacity of the Inspector to deal with a matter of minor misconduct on the part of a Commission officer. This is in spite of the fact that the Commission appears to have exercised their powers under section 196(9) properly.

The difficulty arises from what the Parliamentary Inspector sees as inadequacies in the definition of minor misconduct under section 4 of the Act.

It was that portion that immediately made me think of a previous episode that I had experienced. I have located that report. It was tabled in this place by myself on 26 November 2015, and tabled in the other place by the member for Albany, who is now, of course, the Speaker. That is the twenty-fifth report titled “Parliamentary Inspector’s Report on Allegations of Misconduct Made Against Officers in the Corruption and Crime Commission’s Electronic Collection Unit”. The episode that is captured by the twenty-fifth report of November 2015 has its genesis in allegations that were investigated by the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission into the officer of the commission who possessed and was using in his workplace a substance that was prohibited under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981. This product goes by the name of Jack3d. As the committee was informed at the time, this is a drug that is associated with bodybuilding. It was also alleged that other commission staff knew about this practice for some time but did not report it to their superiors. The report provided to the joint standing committee, in what would have then been the thirty-ninth Parliament, by the parliamentary inspector also analysed the effectiveness and appropriateness of the procedures used by the Corruption and Crime Commission to notify the parliamentary inspector and to conduct an investigation into the allegations.

That is the broad context of why the parliamentary inspector reported to the joint standing committee in November 2015. To the extent that it has very significant similarities to the matter that is now before us in the eleventh report, tabled in June this year, once again, it revolves around the issue of what extent the parliamentary inspector is precluded from investigating matters that are deemed by the Corruption and Crime Commission to be what I would refer to as industrial matters. There was a very significant difference of opinion between the Corruption and Crime Commission and the parliamentary inspector at the time. There were a number of differences of opinion, including whether the officers within the Corruption and Crime Commission should be named in a report by the parliamentary inspector, but that is not the matter that I want to deal with this afternoon. It is the second difference of opinion between the Corruption and Crime Commission and the parliamentary inspector at that time that I think we should consider at this time because it sounds to me as though this is indeed a saga of persistence, because this seems to be coming up all too frequently, notwithstanding the fact that recommendations are made on how these things can be improved.

In this episode in 2015, the difference of opinion was whether the parliamentary inspector had the power to investigate allegations made about two of the unnamed officers who worked in the electronic collections unit. At the time the Corruption and Crime Commissioner, Hon John McKechnie, QC, who is, of course, still the commissioner, claimed that those allegations were industrial matters as defined in the Industrial Relations Act 1979. The differing interpretations placed on those matters were explored in correspondence that was provided to the committee. I think it is worthwhile to have a look at what the correspondence said in 2015 and how it is still applicable some four years later. The first piece of correspondence is a letter from Commissioner McKechnie to Hon Michael Murray, QC, who was at the time, and still is, the parliamentary inspector of the CCC. This letter is dated 15 September 2015. It is found in appendix 2, on page 65 of the twenty-fifth report, which was tabled on 26 November 2015 in this house. That letter, dated 15 September 2015, authored by Mr McKechnie reads —

Further to our recent discussions regarding the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Inspector to review the Commission's acts and proceedings with respect to its consideration of allegations concerning Commission officers I take this opportunity to set out my views and my reasons.

The statutory role of the Parliamentary Inspector has important functions and powers conferred by the *Correction, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003* ... in respect of the conduct of Commission officers. Though important, they are limited.

The specific functions and powers to be exercised by the Parliamentary Inspector depend on whether the conduct of the Commission officer is:

1. "misconduct": s. 4; or
2. "any conduct": s. 196(3)(a).

**Where the conduct is "misconduct"**

Where an allegation concerning an officer of the Commission involves "misconduct", the Parliamentary Inspector has power to "deal with" (s. 195(1)(b)), "investigate" (s. 196(3)(a)), "review" and "remove" it (s. 196(4) and (5)).

Upon a removal under section 196(5) the Parliamentary Inspector may do any of the things referred to in section 196(7), including making any decision the Parliamentary Inspector might otherwise have made, had the Parliamentary Inspector exercised an original jurisdiction.

The Parliamentary Inspector may also make recommendations to the Commission, independent agencies and/or an appropriate authority with respect to misconduct (s. 195(1)(d)). For example, the Parliamentary Inspector may recommend the conduct be referred to the WA Police or be the subject of a disciplinary investigation by the Commission.

**The DEPUTY CHAIR (Hon Adele Farina):** Hon Nick Goiran.

**Hon NICK GOIRAN:** The letter continues —

The Parliamentary Inspector may at any time prepare a report for either House of the Parliament or the Standing Committee with respect to a matter "affecting the Commission" (s. 199(1)(a)). Of course, any report must comply with s. 205 and not include information revealing the identities and information in relation to investigations specified.

For the sake of completeness I note that as of 1 July 2015 the Parliamentary Inspector is the only body able to deal with "minor misconduct" of Commission officers. From that date the Commission's jurisdiction is limited to dealing with "serious misconduct" (s. 18) and the Public Sector Commissioner is specifically excluded from receiving allegations about Commission officers (s. 45G).

I do not believe there is any disagreement between us in this respect.

I pause there for a moment, Madam Deputy Chair, as I am quoting from the letter from Mr McKechnie to Hon Michael Murray on 15 September 2015, to note that that was a very significant problem. It is a significant problem if the Corruption and Crime Commission is precluded and prohibited from being able to investigate its own officers when a matter is a minor misconduct matter. It can only look into matters of serious misconduct and, in particular, in circumstances in which the Public Sector Commissioner is specifically excluded from receiving allegations about commission officers. The letter continues —

**Where the conduct is not "misconduct", but is other conduct**

Where it appears there is disagreement is from the point where the Parliamentary Inspector recommends to the Commission that misconduct be the subject of a disciplinary investigation or performance management process. In those cases, for the reasons outlined below, the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Inspector to further review the matter ends and passes to the WAIRC.

Where the Parliamentary Inspector receives a complaint about a Commission officer's conduct, the Parliamentary Inspector can investigate it and make recommendations to others: s. 196(3)(a)–(g).

Absent an opinion of "misconduct" the Parliamentary Inspector cannot deal with other conduct. The function to "deal with" is limited to misconduct: s. 195(1)(b).

At any time after notification, s. 196(4), the Parliamentary Inspector may review the Commission's acts and proceedings with respect to the Commission's consideration of the allegation.

Upon removal the Parliamentary Inspector may do any of the things listed in subsection 196(7). If the Parliamentary Inspector stands in the shoes of the Commission and exercises disciplinary powers that are

“industrial matters” then the Parliamentary Inspector’s decision may itself be subject to review by the WAIRC.

The Parliamentary Inspector’s power to conduct such a review of the Commission’s acts and proceedings is limited. It is qualified by section 196(9), which is expressed in mandatory terms: “The Parliamentary Inspector must not undertake a review of a matter that arises from, or can be dealt with under, a jurisdiction created by, or that is subject to, the *Industrial Relations Act 1979*” (“the IR Act”).

I again pause. Members will see how strong Commissioner McKechnie is at pointing out when somebody else’s jurisdiction is said to be limited. He states that under no circumstances should this be done, because it is a matter for the Industrial Relations Commission. In other words, the parliamentary inspector should not even think about looking at one of the commission’s officers if it is an industrial matter. They cannot possibly do that because we are looking at the words in the act. I note with irony that when it comes to matters that are in the province and jurisdiction of the Parliament, there does not seem to be that same rigorous interpretation of the legislation or the state of the law. It would appear that the Corruption and Crime Commission seems to like to squeeze and reinterpret things when it suits it when it comes to matters involving the Parliament, but if it is a matter for the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission, under no circumstances should anyone even dream about investigating those matters, because that is the wording of the act—the statute that has created the situation. I note that irony.

I return to the letter from Mr McKechnie to Mr Murray of 15 September 2015. It continues —

The IR Act —

That is, the Industrial Relations Act 1979 —

confers jurisdiction on the WAIRC, amongst others. The jurisdiction of the WAIRC is expressed widely: “the Commission has cognizance of and authority to enquire into and deal with any industrial matter” (s. 23 IR Act).

“Industrial matter” is also defined widely ...

He goes on to quote section 7(1) of the Industrial Relations Act. I encourage members to have a look at that if they are interested. He continues —

The breadth of the jurisdiction of the WAIRC is reflected in the authorities.

For example, and relevantly to recent matters the subject of discussion between us, an employer’s inquiry into allegations concerning the conduct of an employee is a matter relating “in a fundamental way” to the employee’s work and, therefore, an industrial matter as defined in s7(1) of the IR Act.

Other examples of the exercise of the jurisdiction in the disciplinary and, therefore, industrial context show the WAIRC:

- a) assessing that an employer, in investigating allegations against an employee, failed to comply with its policies and related procedures, which constituted unfair action against an employee “in an industrial sense”;
- b) finding that an employer denied an employee procedural fairness in disciplinary procedures that led to the employer imposing penalties for breaches of discipline, suspending an employee without pay, and transferring an employee;
- c) stopping baseless disciplinary proceedings; and
- d) considering whether the legal right of the employer to impose a disciplinary penalty had been exercised so harshly or oppressively against the employee as to amount to an abuse of that right.

The WAIRC is the body vested with jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with industrial matters and those matters clearly include any matter involving a suspected breach of discipline on the part of an employee.

I pause again to note the strength and robustness of the statements made in this letter from Mr McKechnie to Mr Murray. They make it very clear that the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission is the body vested with jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with industrial matters, and those matters clearly include any matter involving a suspected breach of discipline on the part of an employee. I use that analogy to show that I would have thought that the Legislative Council is the body that is vested with the jurisdiction to inquire into and deal with those matters, which clearly involve suspected breaches on the part of one of its members. If the role and jurisdiction of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission could be articulated in such a robust and insistent fashion, how much more so could the role of the Legislative Council of the Parliament of Western Australia be?

I turn back to the letter from Mr McKechnie to Mr Murray, which goes on to say —

The *Corruption and Crime Commission Industrial Agreement 2013* ... is also relevant. It applies to all but a very small number of officers employed by the Commission.

The Industrial Agreement was registered under Part II Division 2B of the IR Act and sets out the remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment of Commission officers.

Clause 62 of the Industrial Agreement specifies the dispute settlement procedure for “any questions, difficulties or disputes arising under this Agreement”.

**The DEPUTY CHAIR:** Hon Nick Goiran.

**Hon NICK GOIRAN:** The letter continues —

Clause 62.5 provides for disputes in relation to any such matters, which cannot be resolved within the Commission in accordance with the clause, to be referred to the WAIRC.

Clause 10.15 specifies the disciplinary procedures applying to suspected breaches of discipline. Clause 57.6 specifies the procedure to apply where performance management issues are identified.

The Industrial Agreement therefore vests jurisdiction in the WAIRC to deal with “any questions, difficulties or disputes arising under this Agreement”, including any issues arising with respect to the Commission’s acts and proceedings in dealing with disciplinary and performance management matters.

Again I pause to note the insistence by the commissioner of the role of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission and how jurisdiction vests in that body to deal with any questions that deal with matters under the agreement. Might it also be the case that the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council is the body to deal with any questions, difficulties or disputes arising under parliamentary privilege and might we also take such a robust view of the state of the law of Western Australia? I return to the letter, which says —

Therefore, whilst the Parliamentary Inspector is empowered to review the Commission’s acts and proceedings with respect to its consideration of allegations concerning Commission officers generally (s. 196(4)), the Parliamentary Inspector must not undertake such a review where the matter can be dealt with under a jurisdiction created by or subject to the IR Act, which clearly includes the WAIRC (s. 196(9)).

The Parliamentary Inspector’s jurisdiction to review the Commission’s acts and proceedings in respect of allegations of conduct by Commission officers that is disciplinary in nature or performance based, is excluded because those matters are industrial matters subject to the jurisdiction of the WAIRC. Parliament must have intended that such matters be the subject of review by the WAIRC alone.

I pause again to note that the same thing could be said about Parliament’s intention on matters involving parliamentary privilege and its overlap with the Corruption and Crime Commission. One could say Parliament must have intended that such matters be the subject of the Standing Committee on Procedure and Privileges alone or the Legislative Council alone or the Parliament of Western Australia alone. I go back to the letter, which says —

The exception is limited to the Parliamentary Inspector’s power to review certain matters. It does not prevent the Parliamentary Inspector from reporting and making recommendations to either House of Parliament and/or the Standing Committee in relation to those matters, if they are “matters affecting the Commission” (s. 199(1)(a)).

Again I pause to note that for other matters—let us imagine for a moment a hypothetical matter that intersects between the jurisdiction of the Parliament and the jurisdiction of the Corruption and Crime Commission—in the same way, nothing prevents the Corruption and Crime Commission from reporting and making recommendations to either house of Parliament on those matters. If it is good for the goose, it is good for the gander. I find this situation extraordinary, because in Western Australia in 2019, we find ourselves in the very same position in which the commissioner, who penned this letter, found himself in 2015. I go back to the letter, which says —

My tentative views remain that the Parliamentary Inspector can:

- (1) investigate conduct and make recommendations;
- (2) deal with misconduct;
- (3) subject to s. 196(9) review the Commission’s consideration and report on that under s. 199(1)(a); and
- (4) unless the Parliamentary Inspector has formed an opinion of misconduct, may not either review an industrial matter or publish a report about an individual officer’s conduct that falls short of misconduct.

I ask you to consider this letter both generally in the exercise of your role and specifically in relation to your proposed report where 2 officers have not been the subject of a misconduct opinion.

I welcome further discussion at your convenience.

Yours sincerely

John McKechnie, QC  
**COMMISSIONER**

That was the letter from Commissioner McKechnie to the parliamentary inspector on 15 September 2015. I hope that gives members a sense of just how robust the Corruption and Crime Commission is when it seeks to review and interpret the legislation that created that very body, and of the role of the commission and the commissioner when the parliamentary inspector is looking into the conduct of its own officers. It shows just how robust it is about how strict we must be in our consideration of the legislation. Yet, I note that there have been at least two instances in recent times in which the commission seems to take a far less robust approach on matters dealing with the Parliament. I remind members of the first episode in what I have referred to in the past as the Turnseck matter. Members will be able to familiarise themselves with that report. The Standing Committee on Procedure and Privileges quite rightly identified some wrongs on the part of the Corruption and Crime Commission and its approach to parliamentary privilege. Then, of course, there is the more recent episode with which all members would be very familiar, having had the time of this Parliament exhaustively used because of the approach taken by the commission.

To conclude the consideration of this particular matter, I turn to a letter from the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission, which followed shortly after that. In fact, it was on 15 October 2015, which was a very auspicious day—it was the day I turned 38. On that day, the parliamentary inspector wrote to me, as the then Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission, and he had this to say —

I refer to my evidence yesterday which touched upon the fact that Commissioner McKechnie QC and I have recently had cause to discuss the scope of my misconduct function, and of ss 196(9) and 205 of the Act.

The Commissioner gave me a copy of his letter to you dated 9 October 2015 which, I understand, included copies of his four letters to me dated 15 September 2015.

I write this letter to you because it may be beneficial for the Committee to have a greater understanding of the nature of the issues raised by the Commissioner, and of my general views of them.

It may ultimately be necessary to place the issues before the Committee by way of report, containing detailed arguments in support of our respective opinions, but at the moment I take the view that we should be able to reach a common understanding about the matters of law involved, both of which may affect the performance of my duties, including to report to the Parliament and to the Committee.

As to that I repeat the point to which I alluded before the Committee that it is my responsibility to decide how I must proceed in the discharge of my statutory functions, although, of course, I will always be grateful to have the input and views of both the Committee and the Commissioner.

He goes on in his letter to deal with what I described as the section 205 issue—a disagreement between the Corruption and Crime Commissioner and the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission about a related but different issue that I do not want us to be distracted by at this point. I will go to the part of his letter that deals with the issue of his misconduct function under section 196(9) of the act. He writes —

The Commissioner raises two issues concerning my misconduct function:

**The DEPUTY CHAIR:** Hon Nick Goiran.

**Hon NICK GOIRAN:** The letter continues —

1. I may not report to Parliament any conduct of a Commission officer which is not misconduct, and
2. s 196(9) of the Act precludes me from examining the conduct of a Commission officer which is not found to be misconduct, but which may become the subject of internal disciplinary action (and is therefore ‘industrial’ in nature).

I respectfully disagree with the Commissioner’s first point.

The performance of my functions and powers are matters which may be reported to the Parliament because they will inevitably be matters which affect the Commission (a prerequisite of my reporting power under s 199 of the Act). My misconduct function—which is to ‘deal with’ matters of misconduct on the part of the Commission or a Commission officer—is not fulfilled only in instances when I assess such conduct as constituting misconduct; the function is equally performed when I assess an allegation as not constituting misconduct.

Further, the fulfilment of my misconduct function invariably involves the simultaneous fulfilment of other functions, such as the assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the Commission's procedures, and the making of recommendations to the Commission, or to the Parliament. The fulfilment of, and reporting upon, my non-misconduct functions always relate to some factual setting within, or relating to, the Commission, and that setting provides the context which makes a report comprehensible, able to be considered on its merits, and able to be properly responded to by the Parliament, the Commission and other interested persons.

In relation to the Commissioner's second point, my view is that the substantive conduct of a Commission officer, when it is the subject of an allegation, falls within my jurisdiction by virtue of my misconduct function. My jurisdiction is the performance of a function under s 195, using the very broadly expressed powers conferred in s 196 in particular.

The requirement for the Commission to notify me arises where there is an 'allegation that concerns, or may concern' a Commission officer, not merely in respect of established misconduct, before I have had the opportunity to review the Commission's proceedings. I may then exercise my ordinary powers of investigation, remove the matter from the Commission and deal with it in accordance with my general powers and having regard to s 196(7). I will make an assessment of the matter and possibly make recommendations to the Commission.

For the purposes of s 196(9) of the Act, any disciplinary or other remedial action taken by the Commission to which the officer is subjected in response to my assessment or otherwise (whether the assessment is one of misconduct or not) may be or become the 'industrial matter' to which the sub-section refers. I will have dealt with the matter with which I was concerned under the Act and the performance of my functions is at an end.

If further dispute arises that is to be regarded solely as an industrial matter between employer and employee, both of whom retain their rights and duties under the *Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)*, and the effect of s 196(9) is to make it clear that I am *functus officio*. If the sub-section was to be interpreted as proposed by the Commissioner it would have the effect of removing retrospectively the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon me otherwise by the Act.

Again, this is a matter adverted to in the Report dated 8 October 2015 at 22–24.

I trust that this information is of assistance to you.

I have provided a copy of this letter to the Commissioner.

Yours sincerely,

**HON MICHAEL MURRAY AM QC**  
**PARLIAMENTARY INSPECTOR**

That is the letter from the parliamentary inspector to me as the then Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission dated 15 October 2015.

I have taken some time to take members through that to identify not only the significance of this type of approach by the Corruption and Crime Commission to current matters that are being dealt with by the Legislative Council, Madam President, the Standing Committee on Procedure and Privileges and indeed all members in a related matter, but also the matter that is before us in the eleventh report, because the committee has quite rightly brought to our attention a report from the parliamentary inspector received by the committee on 29 May 2019. It appears that once again we have a problem in that the parliamentary inspector is restrained because of the definition of minor misconduct under section 4 of the act. It is frustrating when parliamentary committees invest hours of members' and staff's time and other resources into work with no outcome.

If I go back to the report dated 25 November 2015, I note that there were three findings and five recommendations. If the problems were identified in 2015 and we now have a saga of persistence four years later in the eleventh report that was recently tabled in this fortieth Parliament, that demonstrates that there is a systemic problem in the fulfilment and implementation of recommendations that arise from the work of parliamentary committees. There is no point in us investing all this time and having members and staff investigate these types of matters and having a Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission providing reports to the joint standing committee and through it to the Parliament if nothing eventuates. All that will happen is that in another four years, another iteration of the joint standing committee will table another report. We will then have had one in the thirty-ninth Parliament, one in the fortieth Parliament and one in the forty-first Parliament. What will be the title of that particular report? Will it be "A Saga of Persistence Part 2", "The Never-ending Story" or "Groundhog Day"? Whatever title those members come up with in the forty-first Parliament, how exasperating it will be for the

parliamentary inspector and the members in the thirty-ninth and fortieth Parliament who invested goodwill and intent if nothing has come of it.

I thank the four members of the committee for bringing this report to our attention. I encourage them to continue to monitor this issue and report back to Parliament. I am encouraged by the chair's penultimate paragraph in which she writes —

The Committee makes no comment on the report, other than to say that the suggestions for legislative reform raised therein are being carefully considered by the Committee as part of a wider assessment of the Act.

That gives me confidence that this matter is under active consideration. With those words, I support the noting of the report.

**The CHAIR:** I give the call to Hon Alison Xamon. You have got only four minutes.

**Hon ALISON XAMON:** Thank you, Mr Chair.

Hon Nick Goiran made a very useful contribution. I thank him for bringing to the attention of the house the fact that the matters raised in this report were effectively raised in the previous Parliament, yet we have the ongoing situation whereby this Parliament still has very limited oversight of the extraordinary powers that it has entrusted to the Corruption and Crime Commission and to the office of the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission. I believe that is unacceptable to the general public, and it is certainly unacceptable to this house. It is very concerning to hear that this is ongoing. I certainly concur with the comments of Hon Nick Goiran and hope that this issue will not need to be revisited in the forty-first Parliament, or any other Parliament for that matter.

The report highlights that a comprehensive review of the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 is incredibly overdue. Indeed, I would suggest that an entirely new act needs to be constructed from scratch. Successive Parliaments have granted greater extraordinary powers to the Corruption and Crime Commission, yet we have been very lax in ensuring that we keep up with the expansion of those powers by applying appropriate levels of oversight. The report makes it clear that Parliament is not managing to keep up with the gaps in oversight that have been identified, let alone ensuring that the CCC is not overstepping its authority and is exercising the powers that have been granted to it in an appropriate way and for the purposes for which they were intended. As I said in my previous contribution, Parliament envisaged that the Corruption and Crime Commission would investigate organised crime, such as that associated with bikie gangs, for example, large-scale drug importation, and police corruption.

Members need to turn their minds to making long overdue reforms to the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act that would ensure that Parliament is given sufficient power to oversight the Corruption and Crime Commission. We have not invested a lot in the office of the parliamentary inspector. I do not know whether members are aware, but it equates to two full-time equivalents, and the parliamentary inspector himself works only part time. However, we have invested in them a huge level of responsibility to oversight the behemoth of an entity that is the CCC. Unfortunately, through legislative failure, in my opinion, we have further hampered the capacity of the parliamentary inspector to appropriately oversight the activities of the CCC. Parliament created the entity of the CCC; therefore, we need to ensure that the CCC meets community expectations and that we have not effectively created a body that is exceeding its powers, particularly if that is potentially for political purposes. I am sure we would all recognise that that would be utterly abhorrent in modern-day democratic Australia. Parliament needs to have sufficient oversight to ensure that the Corruption and Crime Commission meets community expectations.

**The CHAIR:** Members, unfortunately, temporary order 4 will now cause us to interrupt that debate, but we will return to it in due course.

**Consideration of report postponed, pursuant to standing orders.**